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Reply Brief of Security Title Company 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a second proceeding by Calinois against 
Security Title Company respecting the same lots in 
Evergreen Park Subdivision No. 1 in Weber County. 
The first case embraced these and other lots and was 
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resolved by mutual full releases and dismissal with 
prejudice in Civil No. 1847 45. 
DISPOSITION OF LO\VER COURT 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft at pre-trial conference, 
after considering the pleadings in this case, the file in 
Civil No. 1847 45 and the representations and arguments 
of counsel, dismissed the Complaint on the basis of 
res adjudicata as to the 53 lots involved. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Plaintiff, Calinois, seeks reversal of Judge 
Croft's decision; and Defendant-Respondent, Security 
Title Company, seeks affirmation of that decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Though the basic facts are set forth by Judge 
Croft in his Memorandum Decision at pages 2-7 inclu-
sive (R 102-107), we believe that other salient factual 
items must be identified to aid this Court in its full 
understanding of the issues. 
The underlying facts are found in the copies of 
agreements attached to the plaintiff's Complaint 
(R 4-18) and the Objections to Dismiss (R 46-61), 
and there are no material facts in dispute between the 
parties that would require independent testimony. The 
53 lots here involved are in Evergreen Park Subdivi-
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sion No. 1 in \,Y eber County and are part of a larger 
tract consisting of some 563 lots conveyed to Security 
Title Company as Trustee under a Trust Agreement, 
( R 4) dated November 15, HHW, in which plaintiff 
Calinois, appears as a first beneficiary, and John '"· 
Cunningham appears as second beneficiary. Secmity 
Title was to hold said lots pending payment of certain 
sums by Cunningham to Calinois ($158,430.62). Cun-
ningham then entered into an Exchange Agreement 
in 1968 with Dumont Corporation whereby 500 of the 
said lots were to be exchanged for 62,500 shares of 
Class A common stock of Dumont (then value of 
$500,000.) 
Thereat' ter the litigation involved in Civil No. 184,-
7 45 developed, wherein Calinois alleged that Cunning-
ham had failed to make the payments required of him 
to Calinois and demand was made for reconveyance 
of all of the lots to Calinois by Security Title. Dumont 
was made a party to said proceeding, and after rather 
extensive proceedings the matter was resolved by a 
"Settlement Agreement and General Release" (R 
46-52) wherein they agreed to a settlement of all claims 
between all of the parties and dismissal of the law 
suit with prejudice. This document specifically pro-
vided for the conveyance by warranty deed of 500 lots 
to Dumont and Calinois was to receive certain cash, 
stock and a trust deed and note for $82,500.00. In 
paragraph 1, in consideration of this settlement and 
the receipt of valuable consideration, "Calinois, for 
itself and all persons claiming under it, hereby jointly 
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and severally releases, acquits and forever discharges 
Dumont, Security and Cunningham ... " (R 47). 
Calinois received the 20,625 shares of stock, the note 
and the trust deed, and 500 lots were then conveyed by 
Security Title to Dumont and the residual number of 
lots, being 53, were, on demand, then conveyed to 
Cunningham's nominee. Security Title then had dis-
charged its duties and responsibilities under the Trust 
and the compromise settlement. 
The entry into the stipulation "that judgment may 
be entered" ( R 46) and the subsequent dismissal of 
the action with prejudice are fully admitted by the 
plaintiff in its Answers to Interrogatories and by the 
files and records of the case and at page 6 of its brief. 
Subsequently Calinois observed that 53 lots had 
gone to Mr. Cunningham's nominee, made demand upon 
Security Title, and was informed that Security Title 
had conveyed the lots and had nothing further it could 
convey, and then this proceeding was filed. We see 
nothing in the appellants' Brief that indicates that there 
are facts different from those set forth in the Memo-
randum by Judge Croft, or from which different con-
clusions could have been drawn. 
The deposition of Herbert H. Halliday, escrow 
officer for Security Title, was taken. He handled the 
escrow, prepared the conveyances and was familiar 
with the entire matter. At page 8 he pointed out that 
Dumont was paying Cunningham 62,500 shares of its 
Class A stock for the 500 lots and from that amount 
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of stock Calinois was "to receive 20,625 share~" for its 
beneficial interest in the trust. At that time, page 6, 
Calinois, Cunnningham and Dumont all asserted some 
interest in the lots being held by Security Title. "They 
didn't all claim an interest in all parts that we had. 
Some parts were in dispute." He was then asked about 
the compromise settlement of the dispute and Civil No. 
184,745, and he testified at page 24 " ... it was our 
interpretation that you had settled completely every 
interest that you had in this matter." 
No counter-affidavits have been filed by Calinois 
in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL FACTS WERE BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT AT PRE-TRIAL AND NO FACTS EX-
IST UPON WHICH REASONABLE MEN 
MAY DRAW DIFFERING CONCLUSIONS. 
The determination by Judge Croft was at pre-trial 
rather than on a direct motion for summary judgment, 
but it is akin to it, and the rules for the same are set 
forth in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The basic language of the rule is that such may 
be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." This was the status 
and determination by Judge Croft. 
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We know of no material fact that is at issue between 
the parties. All of the contracts are stipulated to and 
admitted and the proceedings in Civil No. 1847 45 were 
before the court, wherein the case was dismissed upon 
stipulation of Calinois with prejudice as to Security 
Title. The mutual release is a part of the record and 
plaintiff has not, by affidavit, pleading or otherwise, 
asserted any new or different facts other than those 
clearly set forth in the Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Croft. As stated in Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 
Utah 289, 259 P. 2d 297, 298, the party against whom 
the summary judgment is granted is entitled to the 
benefit of having the court consider all of the facts 
presented. This has been done by Judge Croft in this 
case. 
A number of cases have considered the impact of 
Rule 56, providing for summary judgment, in both 
tort cases and in contract cases. In Singleton v. Alex-
ander, 19 Utah 292 ( 431 P. 2d, 126-128, you said: 
Summary judgments are more frequently given 
on contract cases because of the greater ease in 
determining the factual issues. 
Such is surely the situation in the present litigation. 
The contracts are clear and unambiguous and not 
requiring interpretation by external, oral evidence, and 
hence can be read and construed with ease by the court, 
and were so construed by the trial judge in this matter. 
The year 1972 has had a number of cases involving 
summary judgment, one of which involved somewhat 
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similar issues, where an attempt was being made to 
rehtigate the same issues that had been previously 
decided by the District Court. In Orton v. Adams 
(June 22, 1972) 498 P. 2d 654, the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment was granted, determining that 
tile lands involved were not subject to a prior judgment 
lien and that said issue had been previously considered 
and decided by the court-'"Hence there is no issue of 
fact to resolve." In August of 1972 Wingefs Incorpo-
rated v. Bitters was decided, 500 P. 2d, 1007. Summary 
judgment had been granted by the District Court but 
the same was reversed and a plenery trial was ordered. 
Some foundational rules were stated, and the first was, 
The primary one is that if the language of the 
contract is such that the intention of the parties is 
clearly and unequivocally expressed, it must be 
enforced according to its terms. 
Citations affirm that position and we feel that there 
will be no dispute raised in this case on that issue. 
In the decision it then appeared that there were 
issues that were to be raised beyond those stated in the 
contracts, and because a forfeiture was involved, and 
interpretations could be had which would avoid that, 
the court said that it would not follow a strict construc-
tion contended for by the plaintiff, which was "unduly 
harsh and oppressive upon the buyers", but rather when 
there is a choice, an interpretation which will bring 
about an equitable result will be pref erred over a harsh 
or inequitable one. Then on the issue of summary judg-
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ment it was stated again that such should be granted 
"only when it clearly appears that there is no issue 
of fact in dispute which if resolved in favor of the loser 
would entitle them to prevail." 
In our present case there is no equitable or unjust 
result, as Calinois (the plaintiff iu this present case) 
received 20,625 shares of Dumont stock, which was at 
one time worth $500,000.00, plus a note and trust deed 
on the 500 lots in the subdivision for $82,500.00. No 
issues of fact have been claimed or asserted which need 
adjudication, and no harsh or inequitable result has 
developed as a result of the granting of the summary 
judgment in the present case. 
POINT II 
CALINOIS WAS WELL ACQUAINTED 
WITH THE LOTS INVOLVED AND RE-
CEIVED SUBSTANTIAL AND VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION. 
POINT III 
NO DEMAND HAD BEEN MADE BY CALl-
NOIS FOR CONVEYANCE OF 53 LOTS. 
POINT IV 
THE AGREEMENTS, MUTUAL RELEASES 
AND PRIOR ORDERS ARE CLEAR AND UN-
AMBIGUOUS AND NOT SUBJECT TO VARI-
ANCE BY ORAL TESTIMONY. 
8 
Calinois did not in any place contend that it did 
not receive full consideration for the compromise settle-
ment effected in the prior litigation, Civil No. 184, 7 45. 
As pointed out in the .Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Croft ( R 102) , the 20,625 shares of Class A stock of 
Dumont which were received by Calinois were as of 
November 15, rn6G valued at $163,000.00. It is recog-
nized that subsequently the market for the same declined 
substantially, but the same shares were still available 
and were delivered. In addition it received a trust deed 
and note for $82,500.00 secured by the 500 lots in Ever-
green Park Subdivision No. 1. These are to be weighed 
against the original contract for the sale of the entire 
563 lots, as shown in the Trust Agreement (R 4-13) 
for a total consideration of $158,430.62. 
Calinois has been the owner of these lots, was fully 
acquainted with the number, identity and characteristics 
of the lots, and after the extensive litigation elected, 
of its own free will, to accept by way of compromise 
settlement the 20,625 Dumont shares and the $82,500.00 
note and to satisfy, discharge and dismiss all of its 
claims against Security Title. It is_ of no consequence 
to Calinois that Dumont, which was paying the 62,500 
shares of stock and the $82,500.00 trust deed and note, 
claimed and required only 500 lots. This did leave a 
residue to 53 lots for Mr. Cunningham, who had or-
ganized the entire tranaction, been the primary obligor 
in the November 15, 1966 Trust Agreement and had 
entered into the transaction for a profit, the same as 
all other parties had. The mere fact that he could nego-
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tiate successfully from Dumont, his vendee, sufficient 
consideration for 500 lots that would satisfy and dis-
charge the obligations which Calinois expected to be 
paid by transfer of 20,625 shares of DlUilont stock and 
the trust deed for the $82,500.00, is of no consequence 
to Calinois. Calinois, Dumont, Cunningham and Secur-
ity Title were all parties to the compromise settlement 
( R 46-52) . No inequities exist in this tranaction, as 
Calinois sold the land, consisting of the numerous lots 
that they had, and received valuable consideration for 
the same. Now Calinois not only wants to receive and 
retain the valuable consideration which it had as a result 
of the Settlement Agreement and General Release 
dated October 9, 1969, but asserts that it has somehow 
forfeited out the claims and interests of John W. Cun-
ningham, and is now entitled to the return to it of the 
53 lots now in litigation. 
On this last element it is to be observed that in the 
Trust Agreement, paragraph X (R 8) such a forfei-
ture and return of the lots to Calinois can only occur 
in the event of default by Cunningham in the obliga-
tions involved. This requires notice to Security Title of 
such a default by Cunningham. There is no allegation 
in the record to show that any default occurred after 
the Settlement Agreement and General Release be-
tween the parties in October of 1969, in which Calinois 
"releases, acquits and forever discharges Dlllllont, Se· 
curity and Cunningham . . . from any and all obliga-
tions, claim, debts, demands, covenants, contracts, 
promises, agreements, liabilities, controversies, costs, 
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expenses, attorneys' fees, actions or causes of action 
whatsoever, whether known or unknown.' No default 
could occur in the contract after that date, as Calinois 
had received the full and valuable consideration for its 
sale of the lots and no basis remained for claiming a 
default or forfeiture against Cunningham, and hence 
no right to require Security Title to convey to Calinois 
then existed. 
This demand for the 53 lots is merely an after-
thought dreamed up by someone who had somehow 
forgotten that a full and complete settlement had been 
accomplished between the parties. There was no con-
sideration yet to be paid to Calinois and hence no basis 
for forfeiture. Security is a mere stake-holder in this 
matter. After the General Release and Settlement, it 
conveyed these 53 lots to Cunningham, as it was obli-
gated to do, as the obligations, debts and undertakings 
set forth in the Trust Agreement had been fully satis-
fied and discharged, insofar as Cunningham's duty of 
payment of consideration to Calinois was concerned. 
Seldom have we seen a circumstance where the 
contracts between the parties are so clear and unam-
biguous, and where there is no room for the variance 
by interpretation of the same by some outside parol 
evidence, as would be necessary if any testimony were 
to be taken in this particular case. At every step of the 
proceedings all parties were represented by legal coun-
sel. Particularly in Civil No. 184, 7 45, the Settlement 
Agreement and General Release is in short, clear, 
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concise and unambiguous terms, leaving no question 
whatsoever but that it was the intention of all parties 
to make a mutual, final settlement and general release 
of the issues. Thereafter, by legal counsel, a stipulation 
for dismissal of the case with prejudice was filed with 
the court and the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice was 
then entered. 
Calinois in said Civil No. 184, 7 45, had filed its law 
suit in the District Court of Salt Lake County to gain 
possession from Security Title of all of the then remain-
ing lots covered by the original Trust Agreement of 
1966. It is. true that at that time the number of lots 
involved was 563, rather than 500 lots. Calinois should 
have known that fact, as it is the one who sold the lots 
in the first place. However, in the Settlement Agree-
ment and General Release ( R 48) 500 lots were clearly 
identified in paragraph 5, and copies of the Deed of 
Trust describing said 500 lots are attached thereto 
(R 59). 
Plaintiff's' Brief talks about the letters in N ovem-
ber of 1968, but all of such matters were merely pre-
liminary negotiations and were merged and resolved 
by the Settlement Agreement and General Release on 
October 9, 1969, and the ensuing dismissal with preju-
dice of Civil No. 184,745. No reservations of lots or 
rights by Calinois were contained in the settlement. 
Whether the dispute arose from the alleged def a ult 
in the original Trust Agreement in 1966, from the issues 
raised by the 1968 Exchange Agreement (R 53-55) 
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or the problems which arose when trading in Dumont 
stock was suspended, or otherwise, all matters were 
resolved in the October 1969 Settlement Agreement. 
No new or subsequent contracts or undertakings are 
alleged by plaintiffs. 
The final position of plaintiffs in this appeal is 
that the Exchange was the sole premise for the settle-
ment and plaintiffs did not intend to release all rights 
in and to the lots, (pages 8 and 9 of brief). Such is 
not a valid contention. The Exchange Agreement is 
attached to the Settlement Agreement, as is the War-
ranty Deed from Security Title to Dumont on the 
500 lots. So too is the Note and Deed of Trust for 
the $82,500.00. All of these were entangled in Civil 
No. 184,7 45 and the issues therein stated. Nevertheless, 
the settlement is complete and all inclusive and the 
dismissal of the case was "with prejudice." No reser-
vations of rights or lots is anywhere to be found. 
POINT V 
THE COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT OF 
CIVIL NO. 184,745 COUPLED WITH THE 
MUTUAL RELEASES AND THE NON-AP-
PEALED DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, 
CONSTITUTES RES ADJUDICATA OF THE 
SAME ISSUES. 
POINT VI 
THE SAME LOTS WERE INVOLVED IN 
BOTH PROCEEDINGS. REPETITIVE AD-
13 
JUDICATlON IS CONTRARY TO SOUND 
JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES. 
This case seems to be a classic example of res 
adjudicata in that the same parties were in the same 
respective positions and the same lots were the subject 
of the litigation. Calinois was the plaintiff in the initial 
litigation in Civil No. 184, 7 45 entitled "Calinois Land 
Company, et al., v. Security Title Company, et al." 
It is true that in the prior case some 553 lots were 
involved, whereas in this case only 53 of the same lots 
are involved. The same Trust Agreement dated No-
vember 15, 1966 was the subject matter of the prior 
litigation. The basic issue there presented was the con-
tention of Calinois that Cunningham had defaulted in 
the payment of his obligations under the Trust Agree-
ment, and hence Calinois was entitled to have Security 
Title reconvey the property to it. Such are the identical 
issues here involved, except there is no allegation of 
def a ult, in that the only claim and basis upon which 
the plaintiff can demand a reconveyance of the lots 
remaining, 53 in number, to Calinois, would be that 
Cunningham had defaulted in the performance of the 
terms and provisions of the Trust Agreement. 
Now the parties have resolved these differences by 
the Settlement Agreement and General Release and 
by the subsequent Stipulation for Dismissal of the action 
with prejudice. This stipulation for dismissal with 
prejudice was agreed to by counsel for Calinois,. the 
same counsel involved in this litigation, and also stipu· 
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lated to by counsel for Security Title, the same counsel 
as here involved. 
The Court has had occasion from time to time to 
consider the plea of res adjudicata, and one of the more 
recent decisions along this line is Richards v. Hodson, 
26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P. 2d 1044. This was an action 
by real estate brokers to recover a commission.At page 
1046 the following quotes set forth the general philos-
ophy of res adjudicata and then the application here, 
in which the principal doctrine is also identified as 
"collateral estoppel." 
Strictly speaking, the term "res judicata" ap-
plies to a judgment between the same parties who 
in a prior action litigated the identical questions 
which are present in the later case. Not only are 
the parties bound by the ruling on matters actu-
ally litigated, but they are also prevented from 
raising issues which should have been raised in the 
former action. The rule of law is wise in that it 
gives finality to judgments and also conserves the 
time of courts, in that courts should not be re-
quired to relitigate matters which have once been 
fully and finally determined . 
. . . The defendants here were parties to the 
prior action and litigated fully their claim that 
there was no contract of sale. They have had their 
day in court. They have tried that issue fully and 
now attempt to retry it. 
A form of res judicata applies to situations .like 
this wherein issues which are actually decided 
against a party in a prior action may be relied 
upon by an opponent in a lat~r case. as having 
been judicially established. This doctrme, known 
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as collat~ral estoppel, differs from res judicata 
not o~ly m the fact that all parties need not be the 
same m the two actions, but also in the fact that 
the stoppel applies only to issues actually liti-
gated and not to those which could have been de-
termined. The trend of recent cases is to approve 
this doctrine. 
We think the trial judge correctly held that the 
validity of the sale had already been established 
and that no proof needed to be given on that point 
in the trial of the instant matter. 
We have in our present case the circumstance 
where Calinois was the plaintiff in the first case, and the 
stipulation was made and the order entered of dis-
missal of the complaint with prejudice. Hence such 
was a judgment wherein the issues are actually decided 
upon the merits against a party in a prior action. Such 
can be and is relied upon by Security Title as the same 
opponent in the first case and in this second case. All 
issues have been judicially established in that cause 
of action and as stated in the Settlement Agreement 
and General Release ( R 47) . We reassert that no 
error was committed by Judge Croft in his determi-
nation that, 
Accordingly, I find, as a matter of law, that the 
issues raised in the case at bar with respect to 
those 53 lots were resolved in the settlement in 
184 7 45 and that Calinois, as plaintiff in case No. 
193:327: is not now entitled to relitigate those is-
sues in the new law suit. It is, therefore, ordered 
that the complaint of Calinois against Security 
Title and Cunningham, as an interpleader ~e­
f endant, be and the same is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. (R. 108). 
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WHEREFORE, defendant-respondent, Security 
Title Company, urges the court to affirm the deter-
mination of Judge Croft and to deny the relief sought 
by the plaintiff-appellants in this proceeding. 
Dated this 19th day of December, 1972. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
Of PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS, 
CAMPBELL & COWLEY 
400 El Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Security Title Company 
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